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EXECUTUVE SUMMARY 
 
One of the main components of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Clean Materials 
Program is to prevent the loss of radioactive materials through the use of tracking technologies. 
If a source is inadvertently lost or purposely abandoned or stolen, it is critical that the source be 
recovered before harm to the public or the environment occurs. Radio frequency identification 
(RFID) tagging on radioactive sources is a technology that can be operated in the active or passive 
mode, has a variety of frequencies available allowing for flexibility in use, is able to transmit detailed 
data and is discreet. The purpose of the joint DOE and EPA Radiological 
Source Tracking and Monitoring (RadSTraM) project is to evaluate the viability, effectiveness and 
scalability of RFID technology under a variety of transportation scenarios. 
 
The goal of the Phase II was to continue testing integrated RFID tag systems from various vendors for 
feasibility in tracking radioactive sealed sources which included the following performance 
objectives: 
 
1. Validate the performance of RFID intelligent systems to monitor express air shipments of medical 
radioisotopes in the nationwide supply chain, 
2. Quantify the reliability of these tracking systems with regards to probability of tag detection and 
operational reliability, 
3. Determine if the implementation of these systems improves manpower effectiveness, and 
4. Demonstrate that RFID tracking and monitoring of radioactive materials is ready for large scale 
deployment at the National level. 
 
For purposes of analysis, the test scenario employed in this study utilized the real world commerce 
supply chain process for radioactive medical isotopes to validate the performance of intelligent RFID 
tags. Three different RFID systems were assessed from a shipping and packaging perspective, 
included varied environmental conditions, varied commodities on board vehicles, temporary staging 
in shipping terminals using various commodities and normal transportation handling. We tracked 32 
air express (AE) shipments from a medical radioisotope (MR) production facility in Boston, MA to 
ORNL in Oak Ridge, TN. Each RFID system was individually tested in Type A modified packaging 
with differing quantities of Phosphorus-32 (1,000 μci, 500 μci and 250 μci) for 16 shipments per 
system. Three of these shipments per system contained dry ice (9 total). An additional 16 shipments 
were tested that contained one tag from each system using Type A packaging without Phosphorus-32. 
Twelve of these shipments contained dry ice. RFID interrogators for each system were installed at 
four waypoints along the 1,000 mile shipping route from source to designation via air and surface. 
Each package was expected to be detected by its corresponding interrogator(s) at each waypoint. 
 
System A’s overall probability of detection was 77 percent, System B’s overall probability of 
detection was 20 percent and System C’s overall probability was 75 percent. The presence of more 
than one RFID system in a shipment did not appear to have an effect on any of the three systems 
tested. However, no tests of significance could be performed because group sample sizes did not 
satisfy the standard binomial test-of-significance between independent samples. 
The presence of dry ice appeared to have a deleterious effect on System C, but again sample sizes did 
not satisfy the standard binomial requirement for test of significant difference between independent 
proportions and conclusions cannot be drawn for these results. Phase II of the RadSTraM project 
verified that RFID tagging can be applied to the tracking and monitoring of medical radioisotope air 
express shipments. This study demonstrated that active RFID tagging systems can be feasibly 
integrated and scaled into the nation-wide supply chain to track and monitor medical radioisotopes. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This report focuses on the technical information gained from the Radiological Source Tracking and 
Monitoring (RadSTraM) Phase II investigation and its implications.  The intent of the RadSTraM project 
was to determine the feasibility of tracking radioactive materials in commerce, particularly International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Category 3 and 4 materials.  Specifically, Phase II of the project 
addressed tracking radiological medical isotopes in commerce.  These categories of materials are 
susceptible to loss or theft but the problem is not being addressed by other agencies.   
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
One of the main components of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Clean Materials Program 
is to prevent the loss of radioactive materials through the use of tracking technologies.  If a source is 
inadvertently lost or purposely abandoned or stolen, it is critical that the source be recovered before harm 
to the public or the environment occurs.  Radio frequency identification (RFID) tagging on radioactive 
sources is a technology that can be operated in the active or passive mode, has a variety of frequencies 
available allowing for flexibility in use, is able to transmit detailed data and is discreet. The purpose of 
the joint DOE and EPA RadSTraM project is to evaluate the viability, effectiveness and scalability of 
RFID technology under a variety of transportation scenarios.   
 
Phase I of the study served as a critical component for addressing procedures and protocols needed to 
establish an operational system.  During the first phase, RFID was used to track radiological commodities 
under typical “in commerce” shipping conditions.  The project tracked a series of shipments between Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU) utilizing 
commercial Less-than-Truckload service, commercial truckload service and ORAU private fleet.  The 
testing included single and multiple shipments under different loading and shielding scenarios.  The 
scenarios included in transit as well as overnight storage, and they were tracked using bulk radiological 
monitors at the I-40 Watt Road weigh station.  The testing coupled data from two RFID technologies with 
data collected from radiation portal monitors.  This set of tests verified that active RFID tagging can be 
applied to the tracking of interstate shipments of radioactive material.  Furthermore, it was demonstrated 
that RFID systems are robust and mature enough to be scaled into a nation-wide system with the caveat 
that there is some central database or network that can present the data to a variety of users (1). 
 
Phase II implemented the procedures, protocols and lessons learned during Phase I into a real-world 
environment to test proof-of-concept with a range of tags for large-scale deployment.  RFID systems were 
used to track, locate and identify express air and truck shipments of medical radioisotopes shipped by a 
commercial air express (AE) service between a medical radioisotope (MR) production facility in 
Massachusetts and ORNL in Tennessee.  An RFID manifest system consisting of a standalone database 
and web client was developed to manage data from the tags from several different vendors.  The 
RadSTraM project used operational procedures set by the Department of Energy (DOE) Isotopes Group 
for medical and industrial supply chain shipments of radioactive materials.  This initiative was unique 
because it implemented lessons learned from the previous test phase to evaluate instrument technology in 
a real world deployment. 
 
1.2 OBJECTIVES 
 
The goal of this project was to continue testing integrated RFID tag systems from various vendors for 
feasibility in tracking radioactive sealed sources.  This technology was chosen for a number of reasons, 
including: 
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1. the cost of RFID tag systems have become affordable, 
2. the technology has flexibility in frequencies used, allowing detection a varying distances 
from the reading device, 
3. tags may be passive or active and may be combined with other sensors and technologies, 
such as Global Positioning Satellite tracking, 
4. RFID testing can be combined with ongoing or planned in-commerce projects at ORNL’s 
test-bed at the I-40 Weigh station in Knox County, Tennessee. 
 
1.3 STAKEHOLDER ISSUES 
 
The stakeholders identified in this demonstration were the Department of Energy (DOE), Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory (ORNL), the Environment Protection Agency (EPA), the manufacturers and 
distributors of radioactive medical isotopes, commercial air express (AE) companies, state and local 
governments, and the general public.  All of the stakeholders desire the ability to track radioactive 
material in transit.  For ORNL, this desire was based on inquiries by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) requiring ORNL to provide location information of their radioactive material shipments.  It is 
anticipated that the manufactures, distributors and AE companies that transport radioactive material will 
desire this same information to reduce risk and potentially reduce insurance premiums.  The general 
public wants safe roadways as well as the stringent regulation of radioactive material shipments.  
 
1.4 TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
 
The instruments and technologies used for the RadSTraM study were chosen because they utilize the 
latest off-the-shelf technology.  As such, the components used were experimental in nature with distinct 
advantages and limitations.  These are outlined in detail in Section 3 of the document. 
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2. PROJECT DESIGN 
 
The experimental design for the RadSTraM study combines off-the-shelf technology into an intelligent 
system that meets criteria established for successfully implementing and testing the project requirements. 
 Section 3 covers the demonstration plan as it relates to the real-world facilities used for the study. 
 
2.1 BACKGROUND 
 
Radiation has existed everywhere in the environment, rocks soil, water and plants, since the Earth's 
formation.  The mining and processing of naturally occurring radioactive materials for use in medicine, 
power generation, consumer products, and industry inevitably generate emissions and waste.  
Recognizing the potential hazards of these activities, Congress designated the Environmental Protection 
Agency as the primary federal agency charged with protecting people and the environment from harmful 
and avoidable exposure to radiation.  Essentially, the number of unwanted radioactive sources in the 
United States is not known, as no records of this type are kept, but the IAEA estimates 18-38 million 
packages of radioactive materials are shipped each year worldwide (2). The NRC receives approximately 
300 reports of lost, stolen or abandoned radioactive sources a year. The Director General of the IAEA 
reported that orphan sources are a widespread problem with 34 of 49 countries responding to a U.S 
Government Accountability Office survey indicating that orphan sources pose problem in their country.  
These respondents reported 612 sources lost or stolen since 1995 with 254 unrecovered (3).  The U.S. 
Department of Energy estimates it will recover over 14,000 greater-than-Class-C sealed sources by 2010 
(2). Understanding the extent and nature of a radiological emergency is essential for limiting its adverse 
effects.  In an emergency, the DOE and EPA establish a Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment 
Center (FRMAC) to define and monitor the radiological impact. 
 
Specifically, EPA is the designated Lead Federal Agency in a multi-agency response to releases from 
accidents in commerce of unknown radiological materials, not licensed, owned or operated by a Federal 
agency or an Agreement State.  In this capacity EPA coordinates with the DOE, since DOE has the lead 
responsibility for coordinating the FRMAC, during the early phase of a radiological emergency.  The 
earliest identification of radiological (in commerce) sources is paramount in this process. 
 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is providing support to the EPA, Department of Homeland 
security (DHS), and DOE in their goal of proving technologies associated with the detection and 
clearance of radiological materials in-transit.  ORNL is also providing support to the Tennessee 
Department of Safety in their goal of proving technologies associated with the enforcement of 
commercial vehicle state and federal laws associated with radiological materials and their transport.  This 
is an innovative initiative includes all facets of real world deployment such as instrument technology 
evaluation, secure communications, operational protocols, information technologies, cyber security, 
database development and technical reachback. The results from this study will serve as a critical 
component for addressing procedures and protocols needed to establish an operational system. 
 
2.2 MOTIVATION 
 
Highly radioactive sources are used in everyday life to treat cancer patients, as irradiators to preserve 
food, in industrial radiography to check for welding errors in pipelines and buildings, for thermoelectric 
generation of electricity in remote locations, and for a variety of other purposes. There are reportedly 
some ten thousand radiotherapy cancer treatment units worldwide, with many more radioactive sources 
used throughout industry. Radiological sources are essential to our societies, and there is not practical 
option to secure and control every item, everywhere.   
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There is not accurate figure on how many radioactive sources exist throughout the world. Some of the 
isotopes of most concern include Cobalt 60, Strontium 90, Cesium 137, and Iridium 192.  A huge number 
of applications of these materials make them inherently difficult to track and control. Many of these 
sources are lost, stolen, or simply abandoned when no longer required. In the United States, for example, 
an average of about 300 sources of radioactive material are reported lost or stolen each year (2).  Such 
"orphaned" radioactive sources give cause for immense concern and is most in countries where civil 
authority and regulatory oversight are weak.  Orphan sources are found worldwide.  In early 2002, for 
example, two canisters containing highly radioactive Strontium 90 were discovered in the former Soviet 
republic of Georgia.  The three Georgian woodsmen who came upon them were severely burned by 
radiation.  The United States, the IAEA, and the Georgian government subsequently worked together to 
secure these field radioisotope thermoelectric generators, many of which exist in uncontrolled settings).  
Furthermore, there exist significant quantities of Cesium 137 that has been used to preserve harvested 
grain in some countries and become orphaned, for example. (3, 4, 5, 6) 
 
2.3 PURPOSE OF THE TESTS 
 
The first step in the design and implementation of an RFID intelligent tag system into the supply chain 
process for radioactive materials is for a validation of this technology to be completed to assess how to 
best apply it to the in-commerce process. To this end, the RadSTraM Controlled Shipment Test Phase II 
was conducted to assess the technology in a real-world environment simulated after the DOE Isotopes 
shipping program at ORNL.  This stage of the test plan addresses the nationwide supply chain using a 
major radioisotope supplier and shipper.  Collaborations with the state/federal government agencies and 
the private sector will prove invaluable as RFID technologies are studies.  It is envisioned that RFID 
technology will serve the primary need of the EPA to reduce the number of orphan sources and identify 
radioactive materials throughout their life cycle in the supply chain.  Additionally, it is hoped that RFID 
will provide the capability to pre-clear vehicles that might set of radiation detection sensors to avoid 
further inspection of the vehicle. 
 
2.4 RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION (RFID) 
 
To mitigate the risk associated with the conditions outlined above, the application of emerging 
technologies and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products should be demonstrated and tested.  One 
such technology, radio frequency identification (RFID) intelligent tags, might provide a solution.  RFID 
is a technology that has been used for several years to track consumer products, railroad cars, 
domesticated animals and even people. RFID tags are intelligent labels that can talk to an interrogator or 
reader to indicate that the tag is within a predetermined range.  RFID technology uses radio waves to 
transmit a serial number or other data that can identify a person or object.  
 
The basic concept:  the RFID transponder or RFID tag is typically a silicon microchip with unique 
identification information attached to an antenna.  The antenna enables the chip to transmit the 
information to reader.  The reader converts the radio waves from the RFID tag into digital information 
that can then be passed on to computers that can interpret the information. 
 
A ubiquitous network of RFID interrogators can track tags attached to hazardous and radiological cargo 
through every phase of its transportation route. The readers that communicate directly with these smart 
labels and the Internet will serve as the communications network. The location of the RFID tag can be 
tracked by computer, personal digital assistant or cell phone.  This technology application is especially 
relevant in light of the fact that many radiological monitoring and detection systems are in various stages 
of deployment throughout the world at transportation chokepoints and inter-modal facilities.  
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2.5 SITE/FACILITY CHARACTERISTICS 
 
2.5.1 ORNL Facility 
 
ORNL’s shipping and receiving department is a 15,000 square feet facility with a 30'x30' room where 
radiological shipments are required to be stored.  All inbound and outbound shipments are stored here 
until ready to be moved on.  The RFID interrogators were installed just outside the room above the door, 
see Figure 1. 
 
ORNL Shipping & Receiving 
Radiation containment area
Vendor B
Vendor AVendor C
 
Figure 1.  ORNL shipping and receiving area. 
 
2.5.2 Air Express Facility in Tennessee 
 
The AE facility at the McGhee-Tyson Airport is located in Alcoa, Tennessee.  The 15,000 square foot 
distribution warehouse is located inside the airport perimeter.  There are several loading and unloading 
doors.  The interrogators were located near the inbound door where most AE planes are unloaded, see 
Figure 2.  This provided the optimal condition to see the tagged shipments as they were brought into the 
building.  However, this location made it possible outgoing shipments would be difficult for the readers 
to detect.  The interrogators were set on a high shelf just inside the inbound door. 
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DHL Express Knoxville 
Vendor B
Vendor AVendor C
 
Figure 2.  Air Express Facility at McGhee-Tyson International Airport. 
 
2.5.3 Air Express Facility in Massachusetts 
 
The AE facility at Logan International Airport in Boston, Massachusetts is a 60,000 square foot 
warehouse.  The loading dock has several unloading bays but only two loading bays that are near the 
electrical control room for the entire warehouse.  All radiological shipments coming from medical 
radioisotope vendor are packed for shipment within 30 feet of this room.  This was the best location that 
we found to install the readers as they were up 9 feet above the floor and out of the way of any shipping 
lanes, see Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  Air Express Facility at Logan International Airport. 
 
 
2.5.4 Medical Radioisotope Vendor Facility 
 
The medical radioisotope vendor has a 3,600 square foot shipping department with three loading and 
unloading doors.  Each medical radioisotope shipment is packed in a box and sent down a conveyor to the 
shipping department.  From there shipping stickers are placed on the boxes and the boxes are placed on 
pallets that are picked up by the AE courier.  The conveyor passes within 30 feet the interrogators and the 
pallets are stored just on the other side of the partition.  The interrogators were set in this location as 
space was limited and it provided the best height to not interfere with normal business activity, see Figure 
4.  
DHL Boston
Vendor B
Vendor C Vendor A
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Perkin Elmer Boston
Vendor B
Vendor C
Vendor A
 
Figure 4.  Medical Radioisotope vendor’s shipping and receiving area. 
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3. RADSTRAM RFID SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
 
The technologies tested in this study were chosen from a pool of qualified RFID vendors who responded 
to an open call for participants.  Vendors invited to participate in the demonstration were required to have 
prerequisite background knowledge, experience and capability to successfully meet or exceed the 
requirements of the test.  Furthermore, vendors were required to provide product line samples and support 
at no charge to the government.  Initially, five vendors were chosen to participate in the RadSTraM 
project.  Two vendors dropped out of the project because problems in the production of their product 
prevented them from meeting the project schedule.  The three vendor technologies used in the test will be 
referred to as System A, System B and System C in this report.   
 
Participants in the project were required to provide a technological solution that would monitor medical 
radioisotope shipments while in transit using passive, active or hybrid RFID tags or a combination 
thereof.  Furthermore, the following requirements had to be satisfied: 
 
1. RFID tags with omni-directional read distances up to 50 feet at a frequency available 
worldwide. 
2. The tag readers must recognize the tags when transported in metal trailers traveling at speeds 
up to 30 mph.   
3. The readers must recognize tags in the presence of other tags.   
4. Readers needed to read tags at four locations:  one at the medical isotope supplier in Boston, 
Massachusetts, one at the air express terminal at Logan International Airport in Boston, 
Mass, one at the air express terminal at McGhee Tyson Airport in Knoxville, Tennessee, and 
one at ORNL in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 
5. Tags had to perform in any and all weather conditions and normal shipping and handling 
conditions.   
6. The systems needed a lifespan of seven years without maintenance.   
7. The systems needed an application programming interface (API) providing programmatic 
access to tag data including, at a minimum, the tag ID and a timestamp of when it is seen by 
a reader. 
 
3.1 RFID HARDWARE TOPOLOGY 
 
The RFID hardware topology consists of tag interrogators, cellular and Internet communications, and a 
database for storing and tracking the data (Figure 5).  The database ran a table in Oracle with a web-based 
front-end. 
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Figure 5.  RFID hardware topology. 
 
3.1.1 System A Description 
 
System A uses standard WiFiTM wireless networks or any 802.11-enabled wireless device to locate and 
track assets.  The technology tested in this project used Cisco wireless access points to act as RFID 
readers and other Wi-FiTM devices, without interrupting their normal operations.  This feature turns a 
wireless network into a complete, full-featured real-time tracking and locating system (RTLS).  Little or 
no additional hardware or network cabling is required to realize this RTLS.  A single access point picks 
up active RFID tag messages in its coverage area.  System A’s software provides management of 
complete RTLS system and an application for user-defined alerting, notification and asset management.  
A platform is also provided for linking to existing data systems. 
 
System A’s interrogators were not able to connect directly to a cellular modem.  A computer system 
designed to pass the data from the readers to a cellular modem was set up.  Each reader had its own 
software interface running on the computer.  Each computer reported its “hard coded” global positioning 
system (GPS) location to the database with each tag’s relevant information (i.e., identification number, 
vendor tag type, event type, data source, date and timestamp).   
 
System A’s tags are programmable to send 802.11b-compatible messages at predefined intervals.  The 
tags include clear channel assessment that prevents messages from being sent when Wi-FiTM data traffic is 
present. 
 
3.1.2 System B Description 
 
System B uses a remote sensor interface (RSI) to integrate a Bluetooth/Ultra-Wide band (UWB) radio and 
multiple sensors in a compact form factor.  The RSI relays information between other RSIs and/or the 
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Gateway Controller (GC) and control the sensor/senor interface.  GCs act as mobile access points or 
readers and provide the Wide Area Network connection (WAN) between RSIs and the management 
platform.  The GC supports Bluetooth, WiFi™, mobile phone, satellite and Ethernet communications.  
The management platform provides status view and control of GCs and RSIs.  The management platform 
also provides the Application Program Interface (APIs) to mainstream applications and to popular 
databases such as Oracle and MS-SQL.  The platform is able to dynamically configure the RSI network 
according to a “Class-Based” networking capability that “wakes up” radios only within the desired class 
network, thereby reducing power consumption and radio frequency noise. 
 
The System B’s interrogator consisted of a cellular modem, GPS, and RFID reader encased in a 
weatherproof enclosure.  This interrogator is a standalone unit that required no additional hardware to 
link to the Internet.  The data from the interrogator was sent to a server at System B’s office in Atlanta, 
Ga. using a proprietary data format.  The server then converted the data into a web service then injected 
the data with either POST or GET to forward the information to the ORNL SensorNet server.  From there 
the database was populated with the tag identification number, GPS location (longitude, latitude), vendor 
identification tag type, event type, data source, details information and a date and timestamp.  The details 
information for this tag type gave additional status information of the tag. Details like “Arrival PE_BOS”, 
or “In motion DHL_BOS”.   
 
System B’s tags have an accelerator sensor to activate the tag to send a signal.  The tag will only send 
data while in motion.  The purpose of this is to save battery life by not attempting to pass data while 
sitting still or while in storage.  The status “arrival” indicates that the tags have shown up for the first 
time.  “In motion” indicated that the tag is being moved in range of the reader.  
 
3.1.3 System C Description 
 
System C utilizes the 433 MHz spectrum to detect and decode signals from its family of tags.  Interpreted 
data is converted into electrical information that is passed down to a network of readers.  Readers can be 
used in stand-alone mode or in a multi-drop asynchronous network where the “Node ID” is automatically 
assigned.  Sensitivity adjustment and reader addressing can be done remotely via PC software application. 
 Dynamic reader programming (configuration) is available via PC software application.  The RFID tags 
signal at a pre-set time-interval for the duration of its life. 
 
As with System A, System C’s interrogators were unable to connect directly to a cellular modem.  The 
computer system described above for System A was also set up for System C. 
 
System C’s tags transmit an RF signal at a preset time interval.  Settings such as site identification, tag 
identification, tag age and transmission repetition interval are programmable.  A collision avoidance 
algorithm is used to dispose the transmission around the mean repetition interval. 
 
3.1.4 RFID Manifest Interface 
 
A web-based RFID manifest system was developed at ORNL to manage the test data in real time.  The 
RFID manifest system is a standalone database and web client developed as a proof of concept exercise 
for the vendors participating in the RadSTraM project.  Actual implementation of the RFID tracking 
database in the national supply would be as an add-on module to manifest software systems that shippers 
currently use.  Each shipper may have their own manifest database server that could securely manage the 
shipping company’s manifest.  This provides each shipper with the ability to manage their own tags while 
protecting their information from competing shippers.  
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Screen shots of ORNL’s manifest system are displayed in Figure 6- Figure 11.  Figure 6 displays the 
RadSTraM Project Login screen.  The RadSTraM manifest viewer provides a minimum layer of security 
through this page.   
 
 
Figure 6.  RadSTraM Project Login Screen. 
 
Figure 7 displays the Shipments page of the viewer.  This is the default page that the user sees upon 
logging in.  On the left side of the screen, under the EPA logo is a menu with four buttons.  This menu is 
visible on each page of the viewer.  The default setting is “Shipment List”.  This page shows all 
shipments in the database. The next button, “New Shipments”, allows the user to create a new RFID 
manifest.  Under the “New Shipment” button on the Shipments page is the “Read Me” button.  This is 
text help and information page.  The fourth button on the Shipments page is “Log Out”.  When the user 
logs off the web page, the viewer returns to the RadSTraM Project Login screen. 
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Figure 7.  RadSTraM Viewer, Shipments Details Screen. 
 
Figure 8.  RadSTraM Viewer, Google Earth Map. 
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Figure 10 displays the New Shipment page.  On this page, the user creates a new RFID manifest record.  
The user selects the RFID tag(s) associated with a shipment along and provides the necessary shipping 
information.  This information includes who the shipment is from, who it is being shipped to, the 
shipment number, the shipping method, the package tracking number, the expected time of arrival and 
any information from the manifest that the shippers wants to record.  The “From”, “To”, “Shipping 
Method” and “Expected Arrival” field use pull down menus and the choices are not user modifiable.  The 
“Shipment #”, “Package Tracking #” and the “Manifest” fields are editable as this information is always 
unique.  The information provided on this page populates the database.   
 
 
Figure 9.  RadSTraM Viewer, new shipments page. 
 
3.2 ANOMALIES 
 
System B’s RFID readers have built-in Global Positioning Systems (GPS).  The tags from the other RFID 
vendors were located using ORNL’s GPS.  These systems lose their signal from time to time.  Lost 
signals result in latitude/longitude readings of 0.0/0.0 and cause the tag locations on the Google Earth 
map to be displayed as being in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.  Additionally, GPS signal strength was 
decreased by the indoor location of ORNL’s GPS antennas and the position of the satellites at different 
times of the day changed the availability of the signal.  These types of errors are typical of GPS 
technology but the errors tend to be relatively small.  As demonstrated in Figure 11, the inaccuracy of the 
GPS location is off by approximately 50 meters.   This is typically not problematic unless competing 
shippers or receivers are within a 100 meter diameter of one another.  
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Figure 10.  GPS anomaly. 
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4. METHODOLOGY 
 
In this section the RadSTraM shipping constraints are discussed in the context of testing the feasibility of 
using an RFID system to effectively reduce orphaned sources. 
 
4.1 BACKGROUND 
 
Questions of concern include: What are the most effective package tag/label and reader placement 
locations (options, tolerances)?  What is the effective read rate and range? How well do these constraints 
fit with the typical shipping process?  What training will be required for packaging, warehousing and 
distribution workers?  What is the most effective antenna configuration and what characteristics of RF 
affect the read rate and reliability?  The hard science of RFID must come to terms with the environment 
of shipping radiation sources.  Most RFID adopters typically experience problems associated with the 
following issues: materials translucence and/or absorption, shielding, detuning of the tag antennas, 
reflection and interference when trying to achieve acceptable performance.  RadSTraM was designed to 
illuminate such problems and identify workaround solutions.  
 
4.2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES 
 
This demonstration had the following performance objectives: 
 
1. Validate the performance of RFID intelligent systems to monitor express air shipments of 
medical radioisotopes in the nationwide supply chain. 
2. Quantify the reliability of these tracking systems with regards to probability of tag detection 
and operational reliability. 
3. Determine if the implementation of these systems improves manpower effectiveness. 
4. Demonstrate that RFID tracking and monitoring of radioactive materials is ready for large 
scale deployment at the national level. 
 
4.3 PHSYCIAL SETUP AND OPERATION 
 
On February 23, 2006, RFID interrogators were installed at medical radioisotope facility and AE facility 
in Boston, Massachusetts.  The interrogators for AE facility in Knoxville (Alcoa, Tennessee) and ORNL 
in Oak Ridge, Tennessee were installed on February 28.   
 
The test scenario employed in this project utilized the real world commerce supply chain process for 
radioactive medical isotopes to validate the performance of RFID intelligent tags.  RFID technology was 
assessed under normal operating conditions, including varied environmental conditions, varied 
commodities on board vehicles, temporary staging in operating terminals will various commodities and 
normal transportation handling.  The criteria for the test included: 
 
1. U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Type A packaged (Figure 12), RFID modified 
inner containers with electronic inner containers.  (The U.S. has four levels of packaging for 
non-waste radioactive material.  Shippers of non-waste radioactive material are affected by 
three of these packaging levels:  strong tight containers (STC), Type A and Type B.  STC is 
used for radioactive materials that have minimal impact on health safety and property should 
exposure occur.  Type A packages are required for transporting material that would have a 
limited, non-lethal impact on health safety and property.  Type B packages are required for 
transport of radioactive materials that would have a lethal impact on health safety and 
property should an exposure occur.) 
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2. Type A quantities of phosphorus (P-32) package in Type A inner containers, Figure 13. 
3. Radioactive material shipments from a medical radioisotope production facility in 
Massachusetts to ORNL in Roane County, Tennessee using a commercial AE service. 
4. Packaging configured with active tags provided by three RFID vendors. 
5. Configuration and testing of RFID interrogators provided by the three RFID vendors 
installed at ORNL, the AE facility in Tennessee, the AE facility in Massachusetts, and the 
MR production facility in Massachusetts. 
6. Collection of data and documentation of results using ORNL’s data collection application. 
7. Data analysis and lessons learned reporting. 
 
 
Figure 11.  U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Type A packages. 
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Figure 12.  U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Type A containers. 
 
Thirty-two air express shipments were tested from May 1, 2006-May 11, 2006.  All shipments originated 
at the medical radioisotope production facility in Boston.  The shipments were air expressed to ORNL.  
From ORNL they were sent back to the medical radioisotope production facility.  This round trip route 
was then repeated.  The testing groups were as follows: 
 
1. Three RFID systems: System A, System B and System C. 
2. Four tags from each system type (Figure 14) were used for the test.  Each tag was tested on 
two roundtrip shipment runs (medical radioisotope production facility?AE Boston?AE 
Knoxville?ORNL; ORNL?AE Knoxville?AE Boston? medical radioisotope production 
facility) for a total of four shipments per tag.  
3. RFID readers for each system were installed at each point in the route (ORNL, AE 
Knoxville, AE Boston and MR production facility).  Therefore, each tag tested in a shipment 
should have been seen by a reader eight times per roundtrip. 
4. Two tags from each system were tested individually in Type A boxes containing medical 
radioisotopes. (There were four isotope quantities used in the testing:  P32 1mc, P32 500uc, 
P32 250uc and no radioactive material.  Since the medical radioisotopes are all contained 
within shielded inner containers and the RFID tags are packaged in the boxes outside of the 
inner containers, the four quantities will be considered as a group in the analysis of the data. 
See Figure 13 for a picture of the inner containers.) 
5. Two tags from each system were tested in the presence of tags from the other two systems in 
Type A boxes that did not contain medical radioisotopes.  (Two subtypes of Type A boxes 
were used in the testing: Box Type E (small box with six holes) and Box Type A (medium 
box with one day supply of dry ice).  See Figure 12 for pictures of the boxes.  Box subtype 
was not considered in the analysis of the data.) 
6. Two shipping conditions: ambient air and dry ice (Figure 15). 
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Figure 13.  Vendor tags. 
 
 
Figure 14.  Vendor tags packaged with dry ice. 
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Table 1 displays the experimental design. 
 
  
Table 1.  The experimental design 
Shipment Runs 1-3 
 Isotope 
Quantity 
Shipping 
Condition 
Individual or 
Group 
System A 
Tag A1 P32 500µc Ambient Individual 
Tag A2 None Ambient Group 
Tag A3 P32 250 µc Dry Ice Individual 
Tag A4 None Dry Ice Group 
System B 
Tag B1 P32 500µc Ambient Individual 
Tag B2 None Ambient Group 
Tag B3 P32 1mc Dry Ice Individual 
Tag B4 None Dry Ice Group 
System C 
Tag C1 P32 1mc Ambient Individual 
Tag C2 None Ambient Group 
Tag C3 P32 1mc Dry Ice Individual 
Tag C4 None Dry Ice Group 
Shipment Run 4 
 Isotope 
Quantity 
Shipping 
Condition 
Individual or 
Group 
System A 
Tag A1 P32 500µc Ambient Individual 
Tag A2 None Ambient Group 
Tag A3 P32 250 µc Ambient Individual 
Tag A4 None Ambient Group 
System B 
Tag B1 P32 500µc Ambient Individual 
Tag B2 None Ambient Group 
Tag B3 P32 1mc Ambient Individual 
Tag B4 None Ambient Group 
System C 
Tag C1 P32 1mc Ambient Individual 
Tag C2 None Ambient Group 
Tag C3 P32 1mc Ambient Individual 
Tag C4 None Ambient Group 
 
 
4.4 TEST PROCEDURES FOR THE MEDICAL RADIOISOTOPE SHIPMENTS 
 
The general test procedure used is as follows: 
 
1. Package the tags in modified Type A boxes according to its assigned test condition (see 
Table 1). 
2. Assign a RadSTraM shipment number to each package. 
3. Scan MR production facility’s freight papers, Figure 16. 
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4. Scan AE shipping papers, Figure 17. 
5. Fill out a new shipment form on ORNL’s RFID manifest interface to record the System tag 
number, the MR production facility’s delivery number, the AE tracking number, the isotope 
quantity, the shipping condition, the box type and the RadSTraM shipment number. 
6. Take a digital picture of the package box before it is shipped, Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 15.  Medical Radioisotope vendor freight paper. 
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Figure 16.  Air Express company shipping papers. 
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5. RESULTS 
 
Table 2 displays the overall success rate for each system. 
 
Table 2.  The overall success rate 
 Ratio of Hits Percentage of Success
System A 49/64 76.56%
System B 13/64 20.3%
System C 48/64 75%
 
Two-sample z tests for the significance of the difference between two independent proportions were 
conducted to determine whether the overall success rates of the RFID systems were significantly different 
from each other.  The overall success rate for each system was 76.56% (49 out of 64 hits) for System A, 
20.3% (13 out of 64 hits) for System B and 75% (48 out of 64 hits) for System C.  The difference 
between System A and System B was significant (z = 6.367, p < 0.002) and the difference between 
System C and System B was significant (z = 6.194, p < 0.002). (Sample sizes for the other conditions 
were too small to satisfy the standard binomial requirement that n(p) and n(1-p) both be greater than or 
equal to five, where n is the number of observations and p is the proportion.  Because of this, no 
statements of significance can be drawn about between or within groups for the ambient air vs. dry ice 
condition the presence of other tags condition.)  Table 3 displays the results for the success rate of 
shipments package with dry ice compared to those packaged without dry ice for all tags.  Dry ice appears 
to negatively affect the performance of System C.  Table 4 displays success rates of tags package in the 
presence of other tags.  Again, dry ice appears to negatively affect the performance of System C.  Table 5 
displays success rates for tags packaged individually with medical radioisotopes with and without dry ice. 
 The results in Table 5 show that performance of System C appears to be negatively affected by dry ice.  
The success rates for tags packaged individually and the success rates for tags packaged in the presence of 
other tags appear to be approximately the same, indicating the performance of these systems is not 
affected by the presence of other systems. 
 
Table 3.  Ambient air vs. dry ice comparison of success rates for each  system 
 Ratio of Hits 
Ambient Air 
Percentage 
of Success 
Ratio of Hits 
Dry Ice 
Percentage 
of Hits 
System A 30/40 75% 19/24 79.2% 
System B 8/40 20% 5/24 20.8% 
System C 36/40 90% 12/24 50% 
 
Table 4.  Ambient air vs. dry ice comparison of success rates for each system in the presence of other tags 
condition 
 Ratio of Hits 
Ambient Air 
Percentage  
of Success 
Ratio of Hits 
Dry Ice 
Percentage 
of Hits 
System A 13/20 65% 10/12 83.3% 
System B 5/20 25% 3/12 25% 
System C 18/20  90% 9/12 75% 
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Table 5.  Comparison of each system’s success rates for shipments packaged with P32 medical 
radioisotopes 
 1 mc Percent 
of Hits 
500 
µc 
Percent  
of Hits 
250 
µc 
Percent  
of Hits 
All 
Quantities 
Percent 
 of Hits 
System A 
Ambient 
Air 
  13/1
6 
81.25% 4/4 100% 17/20 85% 
Dry  
Ice 
    9/12 75% 9/12 75% 
System B 
Ambient 
Air 
1/4 25% 2/16 16.67%   3/20 15% 
Dry  
Ice 
2/12 16.67%     2/12 16.67% 
System C 
Ambient 
Air 
18/2
0 
90%     18/20 90% 
Dry  
Ice 
3/12 25%     3/12 25% 
 
5.1 OBSERVATIONS 
 
Two incidents occurred during the shipment runs that are important to note.   
 
1. Technical difficulties with system B’s server were identified during the first shipment run.  The 
tags were packaged at the medical radioisotope production facility in Boston with all supporting 
documentation recorded.  ORNL’s server and System B’s server recognized the tags at the 
Boston facility.  When the shipments arrived at ORNL’s facility the tags were not recognized by 
the readers.  The batteries in the tags were still working properly, so battery life was determined 
not to be the problem.  ORNL’s server was still reading tags from the other vendors, so ORNL’s 
server was not the problem.  (ORNL’s server obtained data from System B’s server, see section 
1.3 for details.) Vendor B was able to get their server back on-line, but the reason for the 
interruption was not identified. 
 
2. During the return shipment of the first run (ORNL to Boston) a package was misplaced.  The 
package contained a tag from Vendor A.  The package left the ORNL facility with all the other 
packages that were part of the shipment.  All the appropriate documentation was recorded and 
ORNL’s server registered the tag.  When the packages arrived at the AE facility in Knoxville, 
one of the packages was not scanned by the AE company.  When the shipment arrived in Boston 
the AE company did not have a record of the misplaced package leaving Knoxville.  We were 
able look up the tag that was in the missing package using ORNL’s API.  We found that the 
package had been shipped and was at the Boston facility. 
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6. DISCUSSION 
 
This section contains summary conclusions and lessons learned for Phase II of the RadSTraM project. 
 
6.1 SUMMARY 
 
This demonstration tracked 32 air express shipments from a medical radioisotope production facility in 
Boston, Massachusetts to ORNL in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.  Three RFID systems were evaluated under a 
number of conditions.  Each RFID system was individually tested in Type A modified boxes with 
differing quantities of P32 (1 mc, 500 µc and 250 µc) 16 shipments per system.  Three of these shipments 
per system contained dry ice.  An additional 16 shipments were tested that contained one tag from each 
system packaged Type A boxes without P32.  Twelve of these shipments contained dry ice.  RFID 
interrogators for each system were installed at four waypoints along the shipping route:  the medical 
radioisotope production facility in Boston, Massachusetts, the AE terminal at Logan International Airport 
in Boston, Massachusetts, the AE terminal at McGhee Tyson International Airport in Knoxville, 
Tennessee and ORNL in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.  Each package was expected to be detected by its 
corresponding interrogator(s) four times per shipment. 
 
System A’s overall probability of detection was 76.56 percent, System B’s overall probability of 
detection was 20.3 percent and System C’s overall probability was 75 percent.  Results for System A’s 
and System C’s overall probability of detection were found to be significantly higher than System B’s.  
The presence of more than one RFID system in a shipment did not appear to have an effect on any the 
three systems tested.  However, no tests of significance could be performed because between and within 
group sample sizes did not satisfy the standard binomial requirement for the test of significant difference 
between independent proportions.  The presence of dry ice appeared to have a deleterious effect on 
System C, but again sample sizes did not satisfy the standard binomial requirement for test of significant 
difference between independent proportions and conclusions cannot be drawn for these results. 
 
6.2 LESSONS LEARNED 
 
Table 6 displays how Phase II implemented Phase I procedural lessons learned. 
 
Table 6.  Implementation of Phase I lessons learned in Phase II of Testing 
Phase I Lesson Learned Phase II Implementation 
A standard form should be designed that 
includes all relevant information. 
ORNL’s web-based RFID manifest system 
contains a standard form on its user interface. 
More attentions should be given to completing 
forms in their entirety. 
A protocol for collecting data was implemented 
that included completely filling forms. 
Shipments should be verified as going through 
each waypoint. 
Collaborating with a national air express 
shipper provided a secondary check of through 
the use of their shipment tracking software. 
Software should automatically run when a 
system reboots. 
New software designed to automatically 
reboot. 
Data should be handled in electronic form to 
reduce human error. 
ORNL’s web-based RFID manifest system was 
developed to reduce the error seen with hand 
written test logs. 
All data should be copied to a single database 
for storage and analysis. 
ORNL’s web-base RFID manifest system 
stores all of the test data in a database. 
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Phase II of the RadSTraM project successfully implemented the lessons learned from Phase I.  Human 
error seen in data logging in Phase I were eliminated in Phase II by the use of a web-based manifest 
system to standardized the data entry forms.  Implementing a protocol for collecting test data helped to 
eliminate errors in data logging.  Using the web-base manifest system to collect and store data increased 
the manageability of the data and provided a user-friendly graphical interface that could be accessed by a 
variety of users.  The results of the shipping runs in Phase II indicate that the use of dry ice in shipments 
of medical radioisotopes does decrease the performance of some types of tags.  However, operating tags 
from multiple vendors in close proximity of each other does not appear to affect their performance. 
 
6.3 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Phase II of the RadSTraM project verified that RFID tagging can be applied to the tracking and 
monitoring of medical radioisotope air express shipments.  The project demonstrated that active RFID 
tagging systems are robust and mature enough to be scaled into the nation-wide supply chain for medical 
radioisotopes.  The development of a web-base manifest system by ORNL to handle data eliminated the 
problems with data handling reported in Phase I of the RadSTraM project. 
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Appendix A.  GENERAL RFID SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
 
 
A typical RFID system consists of four main components: tags, an encoder, readers and a host computer 
(not including the Internet).  The last three components can be configured as independent units or 
combined in one total package (portable or fixed). The RFID tag is made up of a microchip and a flexible 
antenna encased in a plastic-coated inlay (or wrapper).  The encoder is used to write information to the 
tag.  RFID tags are expected to be built into most products and product packaging in the near future.  The 
most common format is a shipping label with a built-in tag, or smart label.  Smart labels can be printed 
and placed on any unit to be tracked.  Tags for supply chain use come in a few basic types.  One 
distinguishing characteristic is whether a tag is active or passive.  Active RFID tags broadcast under their 
own power.  An on-board battery runs the tag’s microchip circuitry and transmitter.  Active tags are 
capable of receiving and transmitting signals the distance of 100 yards.  They are well suited to 
applications where they can be permanently mounted and maintained such as on trucks, railroad cars or 
shipping containers (possibly sea borne), and on high-value military items stored in outdoor supply 
depots or bases.  Passive tags, in contrast, have no battery and draw their power from the listener.  
Electromagnetic waves transmitted from the listener induce a current in the tag’s antenna.  The tag uses 
that energy to talk back to the listener (i.e., backscatter reflection). The phenomenon is similar to radar.  
Whereas radar backscatter is more like an echo, the tiny circuit in an RFID tag can power itself with the 
induced current, and its backscatter is an amplitude modulated response (i.e., the amplitude modulated 
signal can be interpreted as a digital signal of ones and zeros).  When these tags are not in the presence of 
a listener signal directed at them, passive tags are not capable of transmitting a radio signal.  Therefore, 
they do not add unnecessary electromagnetic noise to the surroundings.  Another type of tag is the semi-
passive tag.  It has many of the characteristics of a passive tag (small, lightweight, limited memory), but 
with a battery backup to extend the answer range. Semi-passive tags are becoming more popular for parts 
kitting and just in time manufacturing applications. 
 
The distance a reader can communicate with a tag is called the read range. Communications between 
readers and tags are governed by protocols and emerging standards such as the EPC UHF Class 1 
standard for supply chain applications.  The properties of radio waves are frequency dependent.  At low 
frequencies radio waves pass through obstacles well, but the power falls off sharply with distance from 
the source.  At high frequencies radio waves tend to travel in straight lines and bounce off obstacles. They 
diffract at corners, sharp edges and openings.  They are also subject to interference from a variety of 
sources, from sunspots to other electrical equipment.  Radio communications have uses in all sorts of 
applications, but only if interference between users can be kept at a minimum. For this reason, 
governments tightly license users of radio transmitters, with the exception of the industrial, scientific and 
medical (ISM) bands.  Transmitters using these bands do not require government licensing.  One band, 
2.400-2.484 GHz, is allocated worldwide.  The United State and Canada have also allocated two bands, 
866-956 MHz and 5.725-5.850 GHz, for cordless telephones, garage door openers, wireless hi-fi 
speakers, security gates, etc. 
 
Adopters of RFID systems must protect their investments during implementation by seeking out 
upgradeable devices that will retain their usefulness through the lab, pilot and production phases of an 
implementation.  Devices that are engineered for rugged use in a production environment from suppliers 
with a proven industry experience and a commitment to helping bootstrap their customer base will 
certainly be the most desirable. Device vendors should provide software migration tools that support the 
conversion of the current state of practice over to the use of RFID systems.  Furthermore, as the single 
biggest cost item, users need flexibility in sourcing tags.  Vendors who offer tag compliance and 
certification services, and professional service teams who will help users to achieve compliance are the 
most desirable.  Vendor teams who have RFID and supply chain experience working together on similar 
 A-4 
projects offer the best assurance of success for the move toward volume production with respect to 
system integration and success.  It will be important to find teams who have the ability to work with both 
legacy systems and open-source languages and protocols to ensure against having to scrap a system and 
start over.  Finally, smart labels with bar coding offer the best way to identify and disaster recover from 
RFID problems.  Users should look for ways to stream RFID into the current bar coding processes, and 
partners that will help retain the integrity of both systems for the foreseeable future. 
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